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Abstract
The incorporation of an agglomeration bonus payment to encourage spatial coordination in 
auction mechanisms to allocate payments for ecosystem services (PES) contracts has been 
explored as a promising innovation that could enhance the effectiveness of PES schemes. 
Empirical evidence on the performance of this particular design feature is scant, and 
almost exclusively derived from laboratory experiments using student subjects. This study 
reports results from a framed field experimental auction allocating PES contracts with and 
without agglomeration bonus payments using actual forest land owners in rural China as 
subjects. We find tentative evidence that, in a PES auction that provides agglomeration 
bonuses, subjects tend to bid less in anticipation of receiving bonus payments when their 
neighbours are also successful in the auction. In addition, we have mixed findings as to 
whether the agglomeration bonus is able to induce a bidding pattern in favour of contigu-
ous conservation. The two sets of results convey some encouraging signals of the theoreti-
cally postulated cost-effectiveness and conservation efficacy of the agglomeration bonus. 
Further research from the actual field is warranted in light of the policy significance of this 
innovative incentive mechanism.
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1 Introduction
With the rapid proliferation of payments for ecosystem service (PES) schemes worldwide, 
academics and policy makers have been interested in improvements to various design 
facets of PES. Two particular areas of PES improvement that have been extensively con-
sidered are the enhancement of their cost-effectiveness and their conservation efficacy. 
Mechanisms for awarding PES contracts via spatially coordinated auctions have recently 
been explored as a promising design feature that could improve both the cost of delivery 
and environmental benefits of PES (de Vries and Hanley 2016; Hanley et al. 2012). PES 
auctions are reverse or procurement auctions which competitively allocate contracts to 
deliver ecosystem services (ES), favouring bidders who offer to supply these services at 
a lower price. This scheme is usually believed to be able to deliver cost savings by miti-
gating ‘information rents’, namely the potential extra profits to ES suppliers arising from 
their private information about their own opportunity costs of ES provision (Arguedas and 
van Soest 2011; Ferraro 2008). A prime example of PES auctions is the US Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP) (Stubbs 2014), along with multiple state-level conservation 
auctions in Australia (Whitten et  al. 2013). Further, considerable scientific evidence has 
emerged showing the enhanced ecological benefits of contiguous—as opposed to dispersed 
or isolated—conservation (Margules and Pressey 2000; Williams et al. 2012). In order to 
incentivise contiguous conservation, some PES programmes pay ES suppliers an extra so 
called ‘agglomeration bonus’ (in addition to the basic PES payments) to set aside adjacent 
lands (Parkhurst et al. 2002). Practical applications of this PES design include the Conser-
vation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in Oregon and a Swiss agri-environmental 
programme that provides a network bonus.1
Whereas the conservation auction mechanism is relatively familiar to PES policy mak-
ers, the agglomeration bonus is more novel and largely in the test-bed stage. In the work 
of Parkhurst and Shogren (2007, 2008), the agglomeration bonus was found to be able to 
induce contiguous conservation in laboratory settings. Subsequent experimental studies 
further explored the performance of this innovative instrument under different conditions 
of communication among subjects (Warziniack et al. 2007), different group sizes (Baner-
jee et  al. 2012) with different information flows (Banerjee 2018; Banerjee et  al. 2014), 
and under varying transactions costs (Banerjee et al. 2017; Ferré et al. 2016). Other lab-
oratory studies investigated the agglomeration bonus in auction settings. But those stud-
ies mostly concerned the effects of other auction rules, rather than the pure treatment 
effects of agglomeration bonuses per se (in auction settings). For instance, Reeson et al. 
(2011) explored two auction rules intended to overcome efficiency loss over multiple 
bidding rounds (whether winners in previous rounds are allowed to modify their bids in 
later rounds and whether the end-point is known to bidders). Banerjee et al. (2015) tested 
whether rent-seeking behaviour would be encouraged if the priority to conserve adjacent 
lands is revealed to bidders. In the study of Krawczyk et al. (2016), spatial coordination 
1 The CREP programme in Oregon aims to restore contiguous riparian buffers along stream habitats by 
providing a cumulative impact incentive bonus (CIIB) wherever at least 50% of any five-mile section of 
streambed is put under conservation (USDA 1998). In Switzerland, the Ordinance of Ecological Quality 
provides additional payments for linking up conserved areas (Krämer and Wätzold 2018).
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in conservation auctions is produced by varying the metric by which bids are judged, to 
increase the chances of bids from neighbours being successful. The study of Fooks et al. 
(2016) represents a rare example that assessed the pure treatment effects of agglomeration 
bonuses in conservation auctions.
Most of the empirical evidence to date on the agglomeration bonus comes from labora-
tory settings using student subjects.2 However, much less is known about the performance 
of this PES design aspect within the relevant population of interest (Cason and Wu 2017). 
This would require undertaking experimental methods in the field using actual professional 
land holders. Beyond the scientific usefulness of exploring PES design aspects in the field, 
there is perhaps an even more compelling policy reason for doing so: policy makers often 
find recommendations based on student samples to be unconvincing and even irrelevant 
(List 2011; Lusk and Shogren 2007), despite increasingly reported similarities in results 
given by student subjects and field professionals (Fréchette 2016; Suter and Vossler 2014). 
It is, thus, imperative that researchers move their ex ante policy evaluations into the field 
so that they can better communicate to policy makers the usefulness of instruments such 
as PES. This is even more compelling in countries (such as China) where the usefulness of 
experimental methods in designing policies is still lagging behind.
Our study aimed to address this need by undertaking perhaps the first such framed field 
experiment with actual ES suppliers in which we tested the performance of the agglomera-
tion bonus in a simulated forest-based PES auction. Subjects were recruited from peasant 
farmers in rural areas of China who typically held small forest plots. These forest lands 
were often officially owned by village collectives, but the use rights have been largely allo-
cated to individual peasant households using fixed-term contracts. These peasants, thus, 
hold ‘quasi-private’ forest rights and could become ES suppliers in a forest-based PES 
programme. Many of them indeed had experience of participating in land-based PES pro-
grammes. By moving the experimental auction from lab to the field, this study attempts to 
enhance our understanding of the reaction of actual ES suppliers to agglomeration bonuses 
in an auction setting.
Our investigation into the spatially coordinated PES auction is especially pertinent to 
PES policy-making in rural China. Triggered by catastrophic floods in the late 1990s, sev-
eral influential land-based PES schemes have been rapidly unfolding, such as the Slop-
ing Land Conversion Programme (SLCP) and the Ecological Public-Benefit Compensation 
Programme (EPBFCP).3 The designers of these schemes have aspired to enrol more con-
tiguous plots in pursuit of both enhanced ecological benefits and savings in administrative 
costs that this offers. However, the progress of this agenda has been hindered due to lack 
of effective policy instruments. The government’s previous efforts to promote contiguous 
enrolment in these PES-akin programmes relied heavily on command-and-control policies, 
which may have diminished the degree of voluntary participation of Chinese ES suppliers 
in these PES schemes, undermining their effectiveness.
2 Fooks et al. (2016) invited 24 farmers to their laboratory experiments, but the majority of their subjects 
were 96 students. A few other studies relied on alternative methodologies, such as the questionnaire-based 
choice experiment conducted by Kuhfuss et al. (2015), and the scenario analysis carried out by Drechsler 
et al. (2016).
3 The SLCP was implemented to convert roughly 10% of the country’s cropland to forests ; the EPBFCP 
was intended to conserve 30–40% of the country’s forestland via strict restrictions on harvesting timber and 
other forest products. Both programmes have been compensating the rights holders of enrolled lands (Liu 
et al. 2018).
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PES programmes in China have usually targeted remote rural areas where education 
levels and experience with complex market interactions are limited. Faced with a complex 
PES mechanism, individuals might have difficulties understanding the incentive mecha-
nisms and hence make economically sub-optimal decisions. If so, the added value of these 
innovative PES features could be brought into question. This study thus provides one of 
the first attempts to provide an ex ante experimental investigation of the viability and per-
formance of the agglomeration bonus in PES auctions in the context of rural China, in the 
sense that we draw lessons about the ability of land managers to understand and respond to 
the complex incentive mechanisms. To achieve this, we first seek to directly discern mis-
perceptions and anomalous bidding patterns by closely scrutinizing the subjects’ bids and 
their responses to a quiz exercise and debriefing questions regarding the auction rules and 
the rationales behind their bids. Further, we attempt to assess whether our experimental 
PES auctions that provide agglomeration bonuses are able to deliver the theoretically pre-
dicted effects. In developing the study, the authors collaborated with government agencies 
(primarily with the State Forestry Administration of China). Our intention was to exem-
plify to Chinese policy makers the usefulness of experimental methods as a tool to inform 
policy design. Our results (derived from actual forest land owners) would serve as a ‘proof 
of concept’ for the potential use of the agglomeration bonus beyond the laboratory setting. 
So, in sum the contributions of this paper do not only speak to the applied experimental 
literature (via our findings from exploring the agglomeration bonus in a more realistic field 
setting), but also speak to the broader policy literature on the development of PES. We add 
to the academic voices that have argued that in order for these markets to be developed, it 
is imperative that we produce a critical mass of such ‘evidence based’ studies (Ferraro and 
Pattanayak 2006; Baylis et al 2015). Lastly, the policy significance of the study is further 
heightened by the fact that it takes place in China which is potentially the world’s largest 
ecosystem service market (for carbon, water and forest related services). Hence, under-
standing how more complex design rules for PES can work in this region is of particular 
significance for the wider development and proliferation of such market based instruments 
in developing and transition economies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section  2 presents a theoretical model which 
describes the optimal bidding strategies in a PES auction, and how these strategies are 
adapted in response to the introduction of the agglomeration bonus. These theoretical pre-
dictions give rise to several testable hypotheses which were examined by a framed field 
experiment as specified in Sect.  3. Section  4 reports the data, analytical methods and 
empirical results. The paper concludes in Sect. 5 with a discussion of the key findings of 
the study as well as the implications for PES policy making in rural China.
2  Theoretical Framework
This section provides a basic theoretical discussion of the optimal bidding strategies of ES 
suppliers in a PES auction (adapted from Fooks et al. 2016; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort 1997). This discussion gives rise to theoretical predictions regarding the effects 
of agglomeration bonuses on the optimal bidding strategies, serving as the theoretical basis 
of our framed field experiment.
We start with a conservation auction without agglomeration bonuses. In the context of a 
forest-based PES programme, forest holders deliver ES by conserving their forest resources 
rather than clear-felling. Suppose forest holder i has private information about the positive 
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opportunity cost of ES provision ( 훿
i
 ). If forest holder i tenders a bid ( b
i
 ) and is selected into 
the programme, this person will receive a payment that equals to b
i
 , given a discriminat-
ing price auction format. The programme is modelled as a target-constrained procurement 
auction which aims to enrol a predetermined proportion of eligible forests with the lowest 
bids.4 We further assume that the bid is the only selection criterion: the auction accepts 
bids in ascending order until all contracts are allocated, and the total number of contracts is 
smaller than the total number of bidders. This is a sealed-bid auction, which does not give 
a bidder complete information about others’ bids. We therefore describe a bidder’s per-
ceived probability of being selected as a function of his/her own bid [ P
i
(
b
i
)
 ], and the prob-
ability decreases as b
i
 increases. The forest holder is assumed to be risk-neutral, and would 
thus choose a bid to maximise the expected net benefit of winning the auction:
The first order condition of Eq. 1 can be derived by differentiating Eq. 1with respect to 
b
i
 . The optimal bidding strategy can then be solved by equating this first order condition to 
zero:
with the second order condition
in which P�
i
(
b
i
)
=
휕P
i(bi)
휕b
i
 , and P��
i
(
b
i
)
=
휕
2
P
i(bi)
휕b
2
i
 . The optimal bid b∗
i
 satisfies Eqs. 2 and 3. 
There exists a mark-up above the opportunity cost: b∗
i
− 𝛿
i
= −
P
i(bi)
P
�
i
(bi)
> 0.
In the agglomeration bonus scenario, if the holders of two adjacent forest plots are 
selected into the programme simultaneously, each of them would receive a bonus payment 
( a ) in addition to the basic compensation they bid for, bi. Suppose forest holder i has a cer-
tain number of neighbours ( n ), and thus expects an agglomeration bonus payment ( a
in
> 0 ) 
which depends on the enrolment of other bidders and is not determined by bidder i (Fooks 
et al. 2016). His/her expected net payoff can be expressed as:
We can solve for the optimal bidding strategy of this forest holder using the first order 
condition:
Let b̂∗
i
 represent the optimal bid that satisfies Eq. 5. Since a
in
> 0 and P′
i
(
b
i
)
< 0 , we 
have 
(
b̂
∗
i
− 𝛿
i
)
P
�
i
(
b̂
∗
i
)
+ P
i
(
b̂
∗
i
)
= −a
in
P
�
i
(
b̂
∗
i
)
> 0 . It can thus be proved that b̂∗
i
< b
∗
i
 , since 
(
b
∗
i
− 훿
i
)
P
�
i
(
b
∗
i
)
+ P
i
(
b
∗
i
)
= 0 (Eq. 2) and 
(
b
i
− 𝛿
i
)
P
��
i
(
b
i
)
+ 2P�
i
(
b
i
)
< 0 (Eq. 3).
That is, forest holders should tender lower bids, on average, when the PES auction 
includes an agglomeration bonus. Intuitively, the agglomeration bonus creates an addi-
tional expected benefit from winning which results in lower bids being offered to enhance 
(1)
(
b
i
− 훿
i
)
P
i
(
b
i
)
(2)
(
b
i
− 훿
i
)
P
�
i
(
b
i
)
+ P
i
(
b
i
)
= 0,
(3)
(
b
i
− 𝛿
i
)
P
��
i
(
b
i
)
+ 2P�
i
(
b
i
)
< 0,
(4)
(
b
i
+ a
in
− 훿
i
)
P
i
(
b
i
)
(5)
(
b
i
− 훿
i
)
P
�
i
(
b
i
)
+ P
i
(
b
i
)
+ a
in
P
�
i
(
b
i
)
= 0,
4 Land-based PES programmes in China typically specify both the budget and targeted acreage based on 
crude estimates of conservation costs per unit area. For instance, the SLCP intended to afforest 14.67 mil-
lion hectares of agricultural lands (Xu et al. 2010a). The central government usually assigns disaggregated 
targets to its local representatives as a critical criterion for assessing their performance in implementing the 
PES programme. Handing out budgets without explicitly targeted outcomes (which characterises a budget-
constrained scheme) is rare in our local contexts.
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the probability of winning. In addition, one bidder would anticipate a downwards shift in 
others’ bids for the same reason, and may hence further bring down his/her own optimal 
bid. In other words, a bidder in the agglomeration bonus treatment would bid lower not 
only through the direct effect of the bonus but also indirectly through the expectation that 
others would as well lower their bids.
Now suppose that forest holder i has more neighbours ( m > n ) and expects a higher 
agglomeration bonus payment ( a
im
> a
in
> 0 ). It can be shown that the optimal bid in 
this scenario would further decrease ( ̃b∗
i
< b̂
∗
i
< b
∗
i
 ). Or in other words, in a conservation 
auction which offers agglomeration bonuses, forest holders would bid less to enrol forest 
plots with more neighbours (other conditions being equal). This would in turn increase 
their likelihood of being selected into the conservation scheme and hence induce contigu-
ous conservation. This mechanism can be contrasted with that analysed in Banerjee et al. 
(2015) and Krawczyk et al. (2016), who instead use an Environmental Benefits Index to 
help rank bids. Bids from more connected plots attract a higher score on this Index, and 
thus are more likely to be successful. In contrast, the scheme investigated here offers an 
agglomeration bonus to all bidders.
Based on these theoretical findings,5 the following hypotheses can be proposed:
Hypothesis 1: An agglomeration bonus will induce lower bids in a conservation auction 
(other conditions being equal).
Hypothesis 2: The agglomeration bonus would promote contiguous conservation by induc-
ing even lower bids for those forest plots with more neighbours (other conditions being 
equal).
These hypotheses were tested using a framed field experiment conducted in rural China 
with actual forest holders, as described in the following section.
Fig. 1  Spatial configuration of 
the forest plots in the experiment
5 For brevity, our theoretical discussion assumes that bidders are risk neutral. Alternatively, we can model 
risk aversion (associated with uncertainty in income) following the study of Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort (1997). It can be proved that Hypotheses 1 and 2 still hold.
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3  Experimental Design and Procedures
This section first outlines the general set up of our experiment in order to provide a general 
understanding of it. We next explain its main design features and implementation proce-
dures in more detail. The full protocol is provided as online supplementary material.
Our experiment consisted of asking subjects to take part in experimental procurement 
auctions for conservation contracts in groups of eight participants. Each participant was 
assumed to be in possession of one forest plot when placing their bid. There were eight 
unique plot types, as presented in Fig.  1. The plots differed in terms of timber values 
(10,000; 15,000; 20,000; 25,000)6 and/or the number of adjacent plots (1; 3).7 All the other 
attributes of these plots were identical and kept fixed across participants. The timber values 
were assumed to be fixed through time, in which case it would be economically rational 
to fell the trees right away in exchange for the corresponding payments. Each participant 
was asked to bid for a compensation payment that would make him/her willing to wait for 
1 year to deforest and receive the timber value, compared to deforesting and receiving the 
timber value the next day. This payment represented a PES contract aiming to deliver ES 
by conserving enrolled forests for 1 year. Following the ‘strategy method’,8 each partici-
pant’s actual plot type was unspecified prior to bidding, but would be one of the eight pos-
sible types already known to participants. Participants were asked to place a bid for each 
of the eight possible plots type. After bidding, the actual plot type for each participant was 
determined randomly. The bids corresponding to the chosen actual plot types were then 
entered into a one-shot discriminative price auction, with the four lowest bids selected into 
the simulated PES programme. Finally, our experiment randomly assigned an agglomera-
tion bonus treatment to half of the auction sessions to assess its performance.
6 All the monetary values mentioned in the experiment were measured in experimental currency units, 
which were exchanged to Chinese Yuan Renminbi (CNY) at an exchange rate of 1:200 at the end of each 
experimental session. This was explicitly explained to subjects at the very beginning of each session. The 
relative merits of using experimental currency units (ECUs) in behavioural experiments remain an open 
research issue. Some authors argued strongly against this mode of payment (e.g. Davis and Holt 1993), 
whereas others have found it acceptable in experimental practice (e.g. Drichoutis et al. 2015). In our study, 
the use of ECUs has enabled us to take advantage of the money illusion effect (Shafir et al. 1997) and to 
facilitate the implementation of our experiments in an affordable way. During the exploratory pilot work 
the preceded the final experiment, we designed affordable timber values (around CNY 100 for each sub-
ject on average) and framed them in real (monetary) terms. However, these figures were found to be much 
lower than the actual monetary values of mature trees in our fieldwork locations, which ranged from CNY 
10,000–25,000 per mu of forestland held by each subject. In light of that, many subjects in our pilots (mis-
takenly) assumed that the trees described in our experiments were premature and would become more 
valuable in the future (although our protocol explicitly ruled this out). They were thus willing to take 
conservation actions (by delaying deforestation) without any compensation and bid for zero or extremely 
low compensation. This misunderstanding largely undermined our conservation auctions. In the following 
round of pilots, we explored using ECUs and described timber values in nominal terms according to actual 
monetary values (10,000–25,000 ECUs). This effectively addressed the ‘premature trees’ perception and 
enhanced the viability of the experiment.
7 We intentionally avoided mapping each plot type to a particular plot in Fig. 1, so as to reduce the poten-
tial impact of any letter preference bias (e.g. some subjects may favour Plot A only because it is labelled 
with the letter A).
8 According to existing evidence, subjects tend to give very similar responses between the strategy and 
direct-response methods in experimental settings (Brandts and Charness 2011; Kirchkamp et al. 2009). We 
employed the strategy method so as to obtain more information about subjects’ bidding behaviour at rela-
tively lower costs (Kirchkamp et al. 2009; Kirchkamp and Reiß 2011).
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Having described the general set up of the experiment we next provide a more detailed 
discussion of the decision making process and of key design aspects of the protocol. Firstly, 
every subject’s individual bid for each of the eight plot types was made conditional on his/
her expectation of the bids for the remaining seven plot types made by the other seven sub-
jects. For example, when Participant 1 (out of a total of 8) was bidding for a conservation 
contract under Plot Type 1, she/he would consider the expected bids of players 2–8 for Plot 
Types 2–8. When Participant 1 would next bid for Plot Type 2 she/he would now consider 
the expected bids of players 2–8 for Plot Types 1 and 3–8. Participant 1 would continue to 
bid in this manner for the remaining six plot types to formulate a full list of eight bids. The 
other seven participants would bid in the same way. This process was effective as we did 
not allow bidders in the same auction group to hold the same plot type. Secondly, the com-
pensation that the subjects bid for was to cover forest holders’ opportunity costs of delaying 
for 1 year the felling of trees in each particular plot (as opposed to deforesting right away). 
These costs could stem from inflation, time preference and loss of returns which could have 
been earned by investing the timber income during that year. Therefore, when designing 
the wording used in the experimental protocol, we consulted previous experimental studies 
that used auctions to elicit people’s time preferences (Deck and Jahedi 2015; Harrison and 
McKay 2012; Manzini and Mariotti 2014). Subjects were essentially being asked to choose 
whether to receive a payment the next day, versus another payment after a year plus 1 day. 
The rationale of adopting this front-end delay was to eliminate credibility bias which might 
have arisen had we contrasted an immediate payment with another payment after 1 year. In 
the latter case, subjects might have strongly preferred the immediate payments due to con-
cerns about the credibility of future payments. Adopting a front-end delay design aimed at 
cancelling out such bias since both options in the choice set were future payments (Carls-
son et al. 2012; Harrison et al. 2002).
After the bidding process, we drew lots without replacement so as to obtain the (single) 
assigned forest plot for each player and informed the subjects about this outcome. Then in 
each group of eight subjects, the four subjects with the lowest bids were selected into the 
simulated PES programme, which represented a target-constrained PES auction. They were 
due to receive the first payments the next day (the PES compensation payments equiva-
lent to the monetary value of their bids), and the second payments 1 year later (the log-
ging profits equivalent to the monetary value of their timber). The other four subjects with 
higher bids would receive the logging profits the next day. This represented the business-as-
usual scenario wherein non-participating forest holders would harvest and sell their timber 
straight away.9 The future payments were made by bank transfer or postal order, depending 
on the subjects’ preference. In order to enhance the credibility of actually receiving the 
future payments, we signed IOU notes in the name of Peking University, which specified 
the debtor, the creditor, the amount owed and the due date of repayment.10 Moreover, we 
recorded the subjects’ bank accounts/postal addresses on actual deposit slips/postal orders 
issued by actual local banks and post offices.
9 In this standard experimental set up the compensation payments sought by the bidders, or the conserva-
tion costs, were the only criterion used for selection into the PES. In comparison, the US CRP and some 
previous experimental conservation auctions (e.g., Banerjee et  al. 2015; Krawczyk et  al. 2016) also took 
into account the expected ecological benefits. We did not incorporate that criterion, which would have made 
our auction rules overly complex, especially in the presence of the agglomeration bonus. This, however, 
should be the subject of future work.
10 This practice was also adopted in the study of Carlsson et al. (2012).
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The experiment was a one-shot auction without repeated bidding rounds. Such one-
shot settings can be commonly observed in field experiments on conservation auctions 
(e.g., Jack 2013; Messer et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2012). This design is advocated by some 
researchers who argue that, in repeated auctions, a subject’s bids might become ‘affiliated 
to others’ instead of representing his/her own opportunity cost (Harrison et al. 2004). This 
concern may explain some laboratory evidence of a decline in the efficacy of the conserva-
tion auction instrument (Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007) over repeated rounds.11 On 
the other hand, using a multiple round design could help subjects better formulate their 
optimal bidding strategy (through adaptive learning). As our resources did not allow the 
use of different treatments on this design element (i.e. both one-shot and repeated bids), we 
decided to choose the one-shot design mostly on pragmatic grounds. Our pilot fieldwork 
found that the typical duration of a one-shot session was about 1 h, excluding the follow-
up questionnaire survey. In light of this, conducting multiple bidding rounds would expose 
subjects to considerable survey fatigue and cognitive load, which might at worst undermine 
the feasibility of our experiment. Further, China’s PES programmes in practice are more 
akin to one-shot schemes. For instance, in the past two decades, the SLCP only had two 
sign-ups targeting different lands. Therefore, a one-shot auction was also considered to be 
more relevant for deriving implications for PES policy-making in China.
We then sought to evaluate the effects of adding an agglomeration bonus element in 
the auction by comparing experimental bids with and without this instrument (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the treated and control groups). In the treated group, the agglomeration 
bonus scheme was implemented to encourage contiguous enrolment. If one forest plot was 
selected into the PES programme, the forest holder would receive a bonus worth 100 for 
each border shared with other selected forest plots. The bonus would be paid to the subjects 
the next day in addition to the compensation they had bid for. In our theoretical model, this 
is tantamount to setting the value of the parameter a at 100 in the agglomeration bonus 
scenarios. Following the study of Parkhurst and Shogren (2008), we set the agglomera-
tion bonus at such a level that the total conservation payment in the treated group (the bids 
plus the bonuses) would be similar to that in the control group (the bids only), based on 
our pilot fieldwork.12 As shown by Fig. 1, for those forest plots surrounded by three ‘rook 
neighbours’13 (B, C, F and G), the agglomeration bonus could potentially add up to 300. 
For the other plots with one rook neighbour (A, D, E and H), the bonus would be no more 
than 100. Our theoretical model predicts that rational forest holders would further lower 
their bids for those forest plots with more neighbours, in anticipation of receiving more 
agglomeration bonuses. Such plots would thus stand a better chance of being selected into 
the PES programme, which would in turn promote contiguous conservation.
The experimental protocol was piloted in both laboratory and field settings. We under-
took pilots respectively with 32 university students and 24 forest holders from one of the 
12 This was achieved by piloting different levels of bonus. We used the same group size and selection rate 
throughout all the pilots.
13 Rook neighbours refer to those adjacent polygons that share at least one common border, as opposed to 
queen neighbours which could share at least one common border or a corner point. They are defined analo-
gously to the movement of chess pieces.
11 Another reason for this decline is related to strategic uncertainty in the network of participants (Banerjee 
et al. 2012).
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counties to be visited in the formal fieldwork. The formal fieldwork was conducted in the 
summer of 2015 with 192 forest holders (24 auction groups with 8 participants each) in 
Sichuan province (as shown in Fig. 2). We purposefully selected Sichuan province as our 
study site, on account of the significance of its forests in the delivery of watershed ser-
vices and biodiversity. Further, it is a province where the future design of PES schemes has 
received considerable interest.14
Following the stratified sampling method, we randomly sampled four counties in the prov-
ince, three villages in each county and sixteen subjects in each village. We conducted two 
experimental auctions in each village with two different groups of subjects, and the agglom-
eration bonus treatment was randomly assigned to one of the two groups. Half of our auction 
groups were randomly assigned to the treated and the other half to the control group (so each 
study arm included 12 auction groups and 96 subjects and obtained a total 768 bids).
Each experimental auction started with an extensive introduction and an exercise ses-
sion. The enumerators made every effort to ensure against misunderstanding of the auction 
rules. The subjects then tendered their bids in private, which were recorded by the enumer-
ators. After that, the enumerators debriefed the subjects in an attempt to elicit the rationale 
behind their bidding decisions. This was followed by attitudinal follow-up questions, cog-
nitive ability questions and socio-demographic questions. Finally, we assembled all par-
ticipants and publicly drew lots to obtain each subject’s forest plot. The corresponding bids 
of each type of plot were sorted in ascending order and the four lowest bids were selected 
into the simulated PES programme. Each subject received a show-up fee (CNY 50) in cash 
Fig. 2  Fieldwork locations on a forest map of China. Notes: Shaded areas represent forests. Source of the 
land use map: University of Maryland
14 Sichuan is one of the only two provinces that accommodate the upper courses of both the Yangtze River 
and Yellow River, the two largest rivers of China. Its forests contribute greatly to water inflows to both riv-
ers. Moreover, they provide vital habitats for a variety of endangered species, including the giant panda. It 
is thus a priority area of ongoing and future forest-based PES in China. These features render Sichuan prov-
ince an ideal setting for our fieldwork.
853Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions:…
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
1 
 D
efi
ni
tio
n o
f v
ar
iab
les
 an
d d
es
cr
ip
tiv
e s
tat
ist
ics
Va
ria
bl
e
Fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e
An
om
alo
us
 bi
dd
er
s e
xc
l.
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
Pa
ne
l 1
: B
id
 (B
id
de
r-l
ev
el
 a
ve
ra
ge
s)
O
bs
. =
 19
2
O
bs
. =
 15
0
Bi
d
11
72
.31
26
25
.06
88
3.1
0
16
00
.19
Bi
d f
or
 a 
pl
ot
 w
ith
 1 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r
11
58
.70
25
55
.26
87
5.8
5
14
88
.29
Bi
d f
or
 a 
pl
ot
 w
ith
 3 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rs
11
85
.91
27
17
.36
89
0.3
5
17
39
.63
Pa
ne
l 2
: C
ov
ar
ia
te
s (
Bi
dd
er
-le
ve
l)
O
bs
. =
 19
2
O
bs
. =
 15
0
Ti
m
be
r v
alu
e d
raw
n  (
10
3  C
NY
)
17
.40
5.5
8
17
.10
5.5
6
Ex
er
cis
e p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
Nu
m
be
r o
f c
or
re
ct 
an
sw
er
s i
n t
he
 ex
er
cis
e s
es
sio
n d
iv
id
ed
 by
 th
e t
ot
al 
nu
m
be
r o
f e
xe
rc
ise
 qu
es
tio
ns
0.8
8
0.1
8
0.8
7
0.1
9
 A
ge
47
.69
14
.86
47
.44
15
.17
Ge
nd
er
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
m
ale
; 0
 =
 fe
m
ale
)
0.6
5
0.4
8
0.6
7
0.4
7
Et
hn
ic 
m
in
or
ity
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.7
8
0.4
2
0.7
7
0.4
2
Ed
uc
ati
on
 (y
ea
rs 
of
 ed
uc
ati
on
 at
tai
ne
d)
5.6
2
3.6
7
5.5
4
3.7
4
Ho
us
eh
ol
d h
ea
d (
bi
na
ry
: 1
 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.6
0
0.4
9
0.6
1
0.4
9
CC
Pa
 m
em
be
r (
bi
na
ry
: 1
 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.2
2
0.4
1
0.2
0
0.4
0
Vi
lla
ge
 le
ad
er
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
M
em
be
rsh
ip
 of
 th
e v
ill
ag
er
s’ 
co
m
m
itt
ee
, a
 vi
lla
ge
rs’
 re
pr
es
en
tat
ive
 or
 le
ad
er
 of
 a 
vi
lla
ge
rs’
 g
ro
up
0.2
9
0.4
6
0.2
9
0.4
6
Ch
ild
re
n
 N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n (
un
de
r 1
6 y
ea
rs 
ol
d)
 in
 a 
su
bj
ec
t’s
 ho
us
eh
ol
d
0.7
7
0.8
3
0.7
0
0.7
9
El
de
rly
 N
um
be
r o
f t
he
 el
de
rly
 (o
ve
r 6
0 y
ea
rs 
ol
d)
 in
 a 
su
bj
ec
t’s
 ho
us
eh
ol
d
0.7
9
0.8
2
0.8
1
0.8
5
St
ud
en
ts
 N
um
be
r o
f s
tu
de
nt
s i
n a
 su
bj
ec
t’s
 ho
us
eh
ol
d
0.7
8
0.8
5
0.7
5
0.8
7
Sa
vi
ng
s (
bi
na
ry
, 1
 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
 W
he
th
er
 a 
su
bj
ec
t’s
 ho
us
eh
ol
d h
ad
 sa
vi
ng
s i
n 2
01
4
0.3
7
0.4
8
0.
40
0.4
9
De
bt
 (b
in
ar
y, 
1 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
 W
he
th
er
 a 
su
bj
ec
t’s
 ho
us
eh
ol
d w
as
 in
 de
bt
 in
 20
14
0.3
1
0.4
6
0.3
0
0.4
6
M
ar
ke
t e
xp
er
ien
ce
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.6
5
0.4
8
0.6
6
0.4
8
854 Z. Liu et al.
1 3
a  C
C
P 
Ch
in
es
e C
om
m
un
ist
 P
ar
ty
b  T
he
 su
bj
ec
ts 
we
re
 as
ke
d 
to
 m
ak
e a
 hy
po
th
eti
ca
l c
ho
ice
 b
etw
ee
n:
 A
) r
ec
eiv
in
g 
a p
ay
m
en
t o
f C
NY
 1
00
 th
e n
ex
t d
ay
, a
nd
 B
) r
ec
eiv
in
g 
a p
ay
m
en
t 1
 ye
ar
 la
ter
. T
he
y 
we
re
 as
ke
d 
to
 sp
ec
ify
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
ay
m
en
t i
n 
op
tio
n 
B)
 w
hi
ch
 w
ou
ld
 m
ak
e 
th
em
 v
alu
e 
th
e 
tw
o 
op
tio
ns
 a
s b
ein
g 
eq
ui
va
len
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
re
sp
on
se
s w
er
e 
ce
ns
or
ed
 a
t 1
0,0
00
. T
hi
s i
s 
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
fil
l-i
n-
th
e-
bl
an
k 
eli
cit
ati
on
 m
eth
od
 o
f o
ur
 ex
pe
rim
en
tal
 a
uc
tio
n. 
W
e 
co
ns
tru
cte
d 
fo
ur
 d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
 th
at 
in
di
ca
te 
th
e 
fo
ur
 c
on
se
cu
tiv
e 
in
ter
va
ls 
of
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
s: 
‘ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 d
um
m
y 
1’
 ∈
 [1
00
, 1
10
], 
‘ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 d
um
m
y 
2’
 ∈
 (1
10
, 1
80
], 
‘ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 d
um
m
y 
3’
 ∈
 (1
80
, 3
00
], 
an
d 
‘ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 d
um
m
y 
4’
 >
 30
0. 
W
e s
tar
ted
 w
ith
 1
0 
in
ter
va
ls 
cu
t b
y 
th
e 0
.1–
0.9
 qu
an
til
es
 o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
se
s (
th
e g
ro
up
s w
er
e u
ne
ve
n 
du
e t
o 
th
e e
xi
ste
nc
e o
f s
am
e v
alu
es
), 
es
tim
ate
d 
th
e b
id
 m
od
el 
us
in
g 
du
m
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
 re
pr
es
en
tin
g t
he
 10
 in
ter
va
ls,
 an
d m
er
ge
d t
ho
se
 co
ns
ec
ut
ive
 in
ter
va
ls 
th
at 
ha
d q
ua
lit
ati
ve
ly
 si
m
ila
r e
sti
m
ate
s
c  T
he
 su
bj
ec
ts 
we
re
 as
ke
d 
to
 m
ak
e a
 hy
po
th
eti
ca
l c
ho
ice
 b
etw
ee
n:
 A
) a
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
d 
pa
ym
en
t w
or
th
 C
NY
 1
00
, a
nd
 B
) a
 5
0%
 ch
an
ce
 (b
y 
fli
pp
in
g 
a c
oi
n)
 o
f r
ec
eiv
in
g 
a p
ay
m
en
t. 
Th
ey
 w
er
e a
sk
ed
 to
 sp
ec
ify
 th
e a
m
ou
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
ay
m
en
t i
n 
op
tio
n 
B)
 w
hi
ch
 w
ou
ld
 m
ak
e t
he
m
 v
alu
e t
he
 tw
o 
op
tio
ns
 as
 b
ein
g 
eq
ui
va
len
t, 
an
d 
th
e r
es
po
ns
es
 w
er
e c
en
so
re
d 
at 
10
,00
0. 
W
e c
on
str
uc
ted
 th
re
e d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
es
 th
at 
in
di
ca
te 
th
e t
hr
ee
 co
ns
ec
ut
ive
 in
ter
va
ls 
of
 th
e r
es
po
ns
es
: ‘
ris
k 
pr
efe
re
nc
e d
um
m
y 
1’
 ∈
 [1
00
, 2
00
], 
‘ri
sk
 p
re
fer
en
ce
 d
um
m
y 
2’
 ∈
 (2
00
, 5
00
], 
an
d ‘
ris
k p
re
fer
en
ce
 du
m
m
y 3
’ >
 50
0. 
Th
es
e v
ar
iab
les
 w
er
e c
on
str
uc
ted
 in
 a 
m
an
ne
r s
im
ila
r t
o t
he
 ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 va
ria
bl
es
Ta
bl
e 
1 
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
Va
ria
bl
e
Fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e
An
om
alo
us
 bi
dd
er
s e
xc
l.
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
La
nd
 di
sp
os
se
ss
io
n (
bi
na
ry
: 1
 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
 W
he
th
er
 a 
su
bj
ec
t’s
 ho
us
eh
ol
d l
os
t a
ny
 la
nd
s d
ur
in
g 1
99
7–
20
14
 du
e t
o l
an
d r
ea
llo
ca
tio
n o
r e
xp
ro
pr
iat
io
n
0.0
5
0.2
2
0.0
6
0.2
4
Ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 du
m
m
y 1
 (b
in
ar
y, 
1 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)b
0.2
3
0.4
2
0.2
3
0.4
2
Ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 du
m
m
y 2
 (b
in
ar
y, 
1 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.1
9
0.3
9
0.2
1
0.4
1
Ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 du
m
m
y 3
 (b
in
ar
y, 
1 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.2
7
0.4
5
0.2
7
0.4
4
Ti
m
e p
re
fer
en
ce
 du
m
m
y 4
 (b
in
ar
y, 
1 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.3
1
0.4
6
0.2
9
0.4
6
Ri
sk
 pr
efe
re
nc
e d
um
m
y 1
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)c
0.3
4
0.4
8
0.3
4
0.4
8
Ri
sk
 pr
efe
re
nc
e d
um
m
y 2
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.1
7
0.3
8
0.1
7
0.3
7
Ri
sk
 pr
efe
re
nc
e d
um
m
y 3
 (b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.4
8
0.5
0
0.4
9
0.5
0
Tr
us
t i
n f
ut
ur
e p
ay
m
en
ts 
(b
in
ar
y:
 1 
= 
ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
0.8
5
0.3
5
0.8
7
0.3
3
En
vi
ro
nm
en
tal
 aw
ar
en
es
s (
bi
na
ry
: 1
 =
 ye
s; 
0 =
 no
)
 W
he
th
er
 a 
su
bj
ec
t c
on
sid
er
ed
 fo
re
st 
co
ns
er
va
tio
n b
en
efi
cia
l t
o t
he
 vi
lla
ge
 or
 th
e c
ou
nt
ry
0.9
8
0.1
2
0.9
8
0.1
4
Co
gn
iti
ve
 sk
ill
s
 N
um
be
r o
f r
ig
ht
 an
sw
er
s i
n t
he
 co
gn
iti
ve
 te
st 
di
vi
de
d b
y t
he
 to
tal
 nu
m
be
r o
f c
og
ni
tiv
e q
ue
sti
on
s
0.7
6
0.2
0
0.7
7
0.2
1
855Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions:…
1 3
immediately. In addition, they earned future payments from the experimental auction worth 
CNY 88.14 on average. The total average payment for each subject thus amounted to CNY 
138.14 (USD 22.10), which roughly equals 1 day’s off-farm wage.
4  Results
Before we formally test the hypotheses described in Sect. 2, we first define and describe 
the variables involved in our analysis, as in Table 1. When selecting these covariates, we 
referred to previous studies on determinants of people’s bidding decisions in PES auctions 
(Jack 2013). We firstly included standard demographic variables such as ‘age’, ‘gender’, 
‘ethnic minority’ and ‘education’, etc. Further, as described by our theoretical model, the 
efficacy of the agglomeration bonus stems from people’s profit-maximising bidding strat-
egies. We thus controlled for several potential barriers to such optimal decision-making. 
These barriers include misperceptions about the experiment, cognitive constraints (Fuden-
berg and Levine 2006), inadequate market experience (List 2003) and insecure property 
rights (Groom et  al. 2010). These are respectively proxied by ‘exercise performance’, 
‘cognitive skills’, ‘market experience’ and ‘land dispossession’ (see Table  1). Moreover, 
as the subjects in our experiment were essentially making trade-offs between two future 
payments, their decisions would be inevitably affected by their time and risk preferences. 
We hence introduced three subjective variables: ‘impatience’, ‘risk aversion’ and ‘trust in 
future payments’ (see Table  1). In addition, according to standard inter-temporal choice 
theory, people’s savings and debts can be regarded as two objective measures of their time 
preferences. Lastly, Table 1 summarises these variables both for the full sample and when 
‘anomalous bidders’ are excluded, the latter being those who did not understand the experi-
mental rules (see details further below).
We then tested the balance of these covariates between control and treated groups (for 
full sample and with anomalous bids excluded). The results of our balance test are reported 
in Panel 2 of Table 2. The covariates examined are found to be jointly balanced between the 
control and the treated groups (the p-value for the F-test is 0.89 in the full sample). Only 
three covariates (‘age’, ‘household head’ and ‘children’) in the full-sample are individually 
imbalanced at conventional significance levels. These tests suggest that our experimental 
groups are well balanced across a wide range of socio-economic variables. Any remaining 
imbalance is what would be expected due to chance. 
Furthermore, we assessed the subjects’ understanding of the experiment and their 
levels of rationality in formulating their bids. The findings directly speak to an important 
research question, namely whether a PES auction that provides agglomeration bonuses 
is understandable to subjects with limited education and market experience. In addi-
tion, this is informative for our subsequent data analysis, which should control for any 
misperceptions and protests. Before the bidding process, all subjects undertook a quiz 
type exercise regarding the rules of the experiment. There were 107 subjects (56% of 
the full sample) that correctly answered all questions in the first attempt, and another 54 
subjects (28% of the full sample) that got one question wrong. In the instance of wrong 
answers, the enumerators would re-explain the rules. Eventually all subjects reportedly 
understood the experiment. Despite that, after the bidding process, 15 subjects (8% of 
the full sample) exhibited protest attitudes and/or conspicuous misunderstanding of the 
rules in response to our open-ended debriefing question about the rationale behind their 
bids. These subjects can be classified as follows according to their answers: (1) seven 
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subjects thought the value of their trees was going to change after 1 year, whereas the 
experiment explicitly ruled out this possibility; (2) three subjects intentionally offered 
extremely high bids to avoid being selected and ignored all other factors (such as the 
subsidy and the bonus); (3) two subjects had difficulties understanding the experiment; 
(4) two subjects refused to carefully think and engage with the rules of the experiment; 
5) one subject mistakenly believed that the number of neighbours was not relevant in the 
agglomeration bonus treatment. The responses from all other subjects did not clash with 
the experimental instructions.
Close scrutiny of the bids revealed that 32 subjects (17% of the full sample) altered their 
bids non-monotonically for plots with different timber values (the number of neighbours 
being equal). For example, as the timber value increased, they first bid higher but then 
lower, or even reversed their bids more than once. This may indicate insufficient under-
standing of the experiment and/or protest behaviour.
The two types of subjects, hereinafter referred to as ‘anomalous bidders’, together con-
stitute 22% of the full sample (five subjects belong to both types, so 42 in total). Admit-
tedly, these procedures cannot fully sieve out all the bidders that had difficulties under-
standing the experiment. Yet, the currently available information only gives indications of 
misperceptions or anomalies for a minority of the subjects. Table 5 in the appendix com-
pares the auction bids and observable characteristics of anomalous bidders to non-anoma-
lous bidders. It can be seen that anomalous bidders are more likely to have children in their 
households and less likely to have bank savings. These signs may imply that anomalous 
bidders are subject to tighter household budget constraints, which may have inclined them 
to bid much higher, so as to either receive a high ‘PES compensation payment’, or lose the 
auction and receive the ‘timber value’ sooner.
Fig. 3  Distributions of bids by treatment and number of neighbours
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We now explore Hypothesis 1 that the agglomeration bonus leads to lower bids in con-
servation auctions. Our analysis starts with the treatment effects of the agglomeration 
bonus on the auction bids obtained from the treated and control groups. Given random 
assignment of the agglomeration bonus treatment we can validly compare treated and con-
trol subjects. Any observed differences in bids should be attributed to the treatment and 
sampling variability. Panel 1 of Table  2 present differences in unconditional mean bids 
(using t tests) between the control and treated groups. Figure 3 illustrates the distributions 
of bids by treatment and number of neighbours. Table 3 reports the regression results at the 
bid level where we control for the effects of covariates on the observed bids.15
Starting with Panel 1 of Table  2, the negative treatment effects on bids indicate that 
the subjects tend to bid less in the presence of the agglomeration bonus, but this finding is 
Table 3  Regression results of the bid-level treatment effects of the agglomeration bonus
Significant results are highlighted in bold italics (up to the 10% significance level)
Asterisks indicate statistical significance: *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01.  Standard 
errors (clustered at the subject level) are in parentheses
Dependent variable: bid Full sample Anomalous bidders 
excluded
Explanatory variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Agglomeration bonus − 203.26
(312.50)
− 237.07
(309.24)
− 367.74*
(219.65)
− 377.91*
(225.42)
More neighbours − 7.22
(20.77)
4.51
(33.91)
Agglomeration bonus × More neighbours 69.52
(79.86)
20.88
(100.11)
Timber value 64.10***
(22.54)
59.40***
(16.32)
Agglomeration bonus × Timber value − 24.44
(24.76)
− 28.41*
(17.01)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject-specific covariates (Table 1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1536 1536 1200 1200
Number of bidders 192 192 150 150
Model significance (p-value) 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.49
15 As mentioned above, the randomisation procedure inherently helps achieve unconfoundedness, implying 
that any observed differences between the control and treated groups should be attributable to the treatment 
per se. However, owing to finite sample size and sampling variability, this property is only valid on average 
across samples, not necessarily in any sample (Imai et al. 2008). Therefore, if covariate imbalance is found 
in a particular sample, as in our case, statistical adjustments should be applied so as to reduce potential bias 
(Imai et al. 2008; King et al. 2011).
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statistically insignificant. We used each subject’s average bid for the analysis instead of the 
eight raw bids to address within-subject correlation.16,17
Table 3 presents treatment results in a regression setting. Models 1 and 2 report results 
from different specifications using the full sample. Both models were estimated using all 
the bids, but we have addressed within-subject correlation by clustering the standard errors 
at the subject level. Further, both models control for a variety of covariates, and village 
and enumerator fixed effects. As can be seen in Model 2, the coefficient of ‘agglomera-
tion bonus’ is still negative but statistically insignificant. The estimate has a 95% confi-
dence interval ranging from − 847 to 373, which implies that in a nontrivial proportion of 
instances bidders would not necessarily bid higher if agglomeration bonuses are provided. 
Table 4  Group-level treatment effects of the agglomeration bonus
Significant results are highlighted in bold italics (up to the 10% significance level)
Control obs. = treated obs. = 12. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: *p-value < 0.10, 
**p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01. The ‘degree of contiguity’ is defined as the number of shared borders 
between conserved plots divided by the maximum possible number of shared borders (four). On the other 
hand, connectivity relates to whether two forest plots share a border or if they can be linked to each other 
through their rook neighbours. For example, as shown by Fig. 1, forest plots C and E are considered to be 
connected since they can be linked to each other through their rook neighbours B and F. For the conserved 
plots in each group, the ‘degree of connectivity’ is defined as the number of connected plots divided by the 
maximum possible number of connected plots (four). We focus on the highest level of connectivity if there 
are multiple clusters of conserved plots in one group
Treated mean (SE) Control mean (SE) Treatment effect (SE)
Panel 1: Actual experimental auctions
Payment (without bonus) 675 (52.22) 993.33 (146.01) − 318.33** (155.07)
Payment (with bonus) 1008.33 (86.63) 993.33 (146.01) 15.00 (169.77)
Degree of contiguity 0.42 (0.09) 0.38 (0.07) 0.04 (0.12)
Degree of connectivity 0.65 (0.08) 0.58 (0.07) 0.07 (0.11)
Panel 2: Simulated experimental auctions
Payment (without bonus) 702.93 (48.62) 986.16 (134.88) − 283.23* (143.38)
Payment (with bonus) 1053.93 (47.33) 986.16 (134.88) 67.77 (142.95)
Degree of contiguity 0.44 (0.02) 0.42 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Degree of connectivity 0.65 (0.02) 0.63 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
17 Admittedly the bid-timber value ratios are indeed much lower compared to other time preference elicita-
tion studies in rural China (e.g. Carlsson et al. 2012). We checked the subjects’ responses to our debriefing 
question and found that many subjects regarded the interest rates of bank savings or the subsidy rate of the 
SLCP programme as a reference point, and made some adjustments according to the auction rules (i.e. only 
lower bids were going to be selected) and the treatments (i.e. timber values, the agglomeration bonus and 
the number of neighbours). This may not strictly conform to the time preference elicitation nature of our 
experimental auctions. But this is likely to be how farmers would react to a conservation auction in our 
study area. In addition, we find no indication of correlation between such reference dependence and the 
agglomeration bonus treatment. This implies that we are likely to be able to difference out such reference 
dependence when assessing the efficacy of the agglomeration bonus, which would give rise to valid esti-
mates of the treatment effects.
16 The treatment effect estimates would be negative and statistically significant if all the raw bids are indis-
criminately used. But the statistical significance may have been overrated, as there likely exists unobserved 
correlation among the eight bids tendered by the same subject, which may have misleadingly underesti-
mated the standard errors (Cameron and Miller 2015).
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We found qualitatively similar findings from the most parsimonious specification that 
excludes all the control variables and only contains the agglomeration bonus treatment and 
other aspects of the experimental design (timber value, number of neighbours and their 
interaction terms with the agglomeration bonus treatment).
However, recall that we discerned 42 anomalous bidders from people who have clear 
misperceptions about the auction mechanism and protestors. We re-estimated the bid 
models using a subsample that excluded these ‘anomalous bidders’, giving rise to Mod-
els 3 and 4 in Table 3. The coefficient of ‘agglomeration bonus’ in Model 4 is statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level, and notably larger in size: the coefficient translates 
into a 43% reduction in the mean bid of the subsample that excludes anomalous bid-
ders. Further, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term between the 
‘agglomeration bonus’ and ‘timber value’ variables suggest that non-anomalous sub-
jects’ bids are reduced to a greater extent for plots with higher timber values. The sub-
sample estimates conform to our theoretical prediction, yet may not be representative of 
the population we wish to study (although we find no covariate imbalance between the 
full sample and the subsample).
Moreover, we tested Hypothesis 1 at the auction group level. As shown by Panel 1 of 
Table 4, the group-level conservation payment in the treated groups (excluding the bonus 
payment) is considerably lower than that in the control groups. This result is in line with 
that of Fooks et al. (2016). After accounting for the bonus payment, total conservation pay-
ments are practically no different between the control and treated groups. However, these 
findings should be taken with caution, as they were derived from our experimental auctions 
that only used one random draw from each subject’s eight bids. To check the robustness of 
the finding, we simulated all possible auction sessions using the recombination approach 
(Margolis and Shogren 2004). We first generated all possible combinations of bids that 
could have been drawn within each original auction group. With Permutations (n = 8, k = 8) 
we generated 40,320 combinations per group, and 967,680 in total across all groups. We 
next worked out the auction outcome of each combination that matches our actual exper-
imental auctions, and calculated each combination’s total payment, which was averaged 
over all combinations of each original auction group. The group means were then used to 
estimate the treatment effects. As can be seen in Panel 2 of Table 4, the simulation results 
are highly similar to those derived from actual experimental auctions. These findings pro-
vide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1 at the auction group level, but admittedly can-
not substantiate the ‘no-regrets’ property of the agglomeration bonus, namely it has the 
potential to encourage contiguous conservation without significant additional budgetary 
costs. Indeed, the mean equivalence tests presented in Table  4 suggests that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that on average the control and treated groups have equal costs 
(accounting for the agglomeration bonus payments for the treated groups). Despite that, 
if we test whether the costs of the treated groups are 10% higher than the control group, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis either  (H0: costs of treated groups—costs of control 
groups ≥ 99.33, p-value = 0.31). In light of that, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
agglomeration bonus would incur nontrivial additional costs.
We next explore the conservation implications of the agglomeration effect. We expect 
the agglomeration bonus to induce even lower bids for forest plots with more neighbours. 
This would increase their probability of being selected into the PES programme and 
thereby promote more contiguous conservation (Hypothesis 2). Going back to Panel 1 of 
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Table 2, we firstly look at the difference in the treatment effect as the number of neighbours 
increases. We have no significant findings. On average the agglomeration bonus treatment 
does not reduce auction bids to a greater extent for plots with more neighbours (− 338 
for plots with three neighbours whereas − 396 for plots with one neighbour). The differ-
ence (57) is relatively small (less than 5% of the mean bid) and statistically equal to zero 
(p-value = 0.92).
In our regression models (Table 3), the dependence of the treatment effects on the num-
ber of neighbours is captured by the interaction term between the ‘agglomeration bonus’ 
and ‘more neighbours’ variables. For the full sample, the coefficient of this interaction term 
in Model 2 is highly similar to the result of the unconditional mean comparison. Upon the 
removal of the 42 anomalous bidders, the counterpart coefficient in Model 4 becomes even 
smaller (2% of the subsample’s mean bid) and remains equal to zero in a statistical sense.18
Despite these findings, one might wonder whether the agglomeration bonus treatment 
has delivered any group-level improvements in the spatial coordination of conservation. 
Table 4 reports two numeric indicators of the contiguity and connectivity of the conserved 
forest lands from each group. Both indicators are formally defined in the notes below 
Table 4. The contiguity and connectivity indicators of the treated groups are both over 10% 
higher than the control groups, but the differences are statistically insignificant. In addition, 
recall that such results might be random as our experimental auctions only used one draw 
of each subject’s eight bids. We thus resorted to recombination procedures to make full use 
of the information from our data. Panel 2 of Table 4 shows that if all possible combinations 
of bids are taken into account, the improvements in the contiguity and connectivity indica-
tors would be rather limited in size (both below 5%), and still statistically insignificant. 
The group-level results somewhat contrast with student experiments, which typically find 
enhanced contiguity of conservation in the agglomeration bonus treatment (e.g. Parkhurst 
and Shogren 2008), although they are not strictly comparable to this study as they did not 
assess the treatment effect in auction settings. Fooks et al. (2016) also found higher levels 
of contiguous conservation in a conservation auction that provided agglomeration bonuses, 
but the statistical characteristics of this result was not reported.
Altogether, our experimental results (based on field data) find no discernible evidence 
regarding the agglomeration effect postulated by Hypothesis 2, either at the bid level or the 
group level. It is possible that the subjects did not thoroughly understand the connection 
between the amount of potential bonus payment and the number of neighbours. Indeed, we 
carefully explained the experiment to the subjects and assessed the robustness of our results 
by excluding bidders that clearly showed that they misperceived the protocol or were protest-
ing. But these procedures may not suffice to completely rule out the impact of mispercep-
tions and protests. For instance, we conducted a series of quantile regressions, which find that 
the estimates for the 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles notably deviate from our expectations, whereas 
those for the 0.25 and 0.5 quantiles are largely in line with our expectations. After dropping 
the highest 10% of bids (or using log transformed bids as a means to reduce the impact of 
extreme bids), we find that the agglomeration bonus indeed leads to lower bids for plots with 
more neighbours, which is in line with Hypothesis 2. Some bidders may have intentionally 
tendered extraordinarily high bids in protest since they were not allowed to opt-out (Lusk 
18 A less restrictive approach is to compare the main treatment effect estimates given by models estimated 
separately for plots with different numbers of neighbours. We have explored this approach and found quali-
tatively similar results.
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and Shogren 2007).19 Perhaps they were not completely identified by our protest diagnosis. 
But of course there could be other reasons underlying the different results given by this sub-
sample and the full sample. For instance, if the majority of the subjects did understand the 
experiment, a subject in the agglomeration bonus treatment would bid lower for plots with 
one neighbour not only through the direct effect of the bonus but also indirectly through the 
expectation that others would further lower their bids for plots with three neighbours. This 
would lessen the effect of having more neighbours in the agglomeration bonus treatment.
In addition, the group level agglomeration effect is also affected by changes in other 
determinants of the offered bids, such as timber values. Table 4 shows that the coefficient of 
‘timber value’ is positive and strongly significant in all the regression models. This implies 
that the subjects tend to bid higher for forest plots with higher timber values, which in 
turn decreases their likelihood of being selected. Therefore, when the agglomeration bonus 
comes into play, it is ambiguous whether forest plots with more neighbours and higher tim-
ber values are more likely to be selected relative to those with fewer neighbours but lower 
timber values. This counterbalancing effect has likely hindered contiguous conservation in 
our experiment. The implication is that, in real landscapes, the spatial correlation patterns 
of the opportunity costs of conservation take on additional importance in determining the 
conservation effectiveness of an auction with an agglomeration bonus.
5  Conclusion
Auction mechanisms and the agglomeration bonus have been promoted in the literature as 
two promising innovations of PES schemes. Few papers have tried to combine these design 
elements in an empirical setting (Krawczyk et al. 2016). In this paper, we test such a com-
bination in a real life setting. Although the agglomeration bonus has attracted widespread 
interest, many unanswered questions remain about the factors which determine its cost-
effectiveness and ecological impact (de Vries and Hanley 2016). So far, empirical evidence 
in this regard is almost exclusively derived from laboratory experiments using student sub-
jects. Understanding of how such a bonus scheme would be communicated and understood 
by actual forest holders or farmers is very limited indeed. One way forward is to further 
test-bed this instrument in field settings. This study undertook perhaps the first framed field 
experiment to investigate the performance of the agglomeration bonus in a PES auction. 
Further, we chose a policy context, rural China, that has further reaching implications for 
the development of PES programmes, given the potential size of ecosystem service mar-
kets in China and the sheer number of people they are bound to affect.
We conducted the experimental sessions in rural areas of Sichuan province, China, and 
randomly recruited actual forest holders as subjects. Our empirical results provide a mixed 
picture of the cost-effectiveness and conservation efficacy of the agglomeration bonus in an 
auction setting. First, we find that bidders in the agglomeration bonus treatment generally 
bid less (irrespective of the number of neighbours), in anticipation of receiving the bonus 
19 Had an opt-out option been provided, the vast majority of our participants would have preferred not to 
bid so as to minimise the time and cognitive efforts required for decision making. The propensity to choose 
the status quo in decision making has been widely observed (Boxall et al. 2009) and is particularly dominat-
ing in our local contexts. Admittedly, the absence of an opt-out option has likely introduced noise, since 
many subjects may have intentionally tendered extraordinarily high bids (Lusk and Shogren 2007). Yet, 
allowing subjects not to bid would substantially undermine the viability of our experiment.
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payment. But this finding is only statistically significant in a subsample that excludes 42 
bidders (22% of the full sample) who exhibited evident misunderstanding of the experi-
ment and/or protest attitudes. However, counterpart estimates from the full sample are sta-
tistically insignificant, and we should be cautious about generalising lessons drawn from a 
subsample which may not be representative of the targeted population. We find that group-
level total bids are significantly lower (by over 28%) in the agglomeration bonus treatment. 
After taking into account the bonus payments, group-level total costs of the treated groups 
become similar to the control groups, but our data cannot statistically reject the possibility 
that the agglomeration bonus may incur nontrivial additional costs (e.g. by 10%).
Second, the agglomeration bonus is expected to induce lower bids for forest lands 
with more neighbours, since the expected bonus payment increases with the number 
of neighbours. These forest lands are thus more likely to be selected into the PES pro-
gramme, which would promote contiguous conservation. We have no significant find-
ings in this regard, either at the bid level (with or without anomalous bidders) or the 
group level, and therefore the jury is still out when considering findings using actual 
forest land users (i.e. non-student subjects) in an actual PES field setting. This is likely 
attributable to the highest 10% of bids, which may represent another type of protest as 
bidders were not allowed to opt out. Upon the removal of the highest 10% of bids, we 
find significant evidence in line with the hypothesised nexus between the agglomeration 
bonus’ effect on bids and the number of neighbours. But the different findings derived 
from this subsample and the full sample may relate to factors other than protest bids. 
Additional research is warranted on whether spatially-targeted and/or spatially coordi-
nated auctions deter potential participants due to the complexity of enrolment rules. We 
also noted the importance of considering the spatial correlation in opportunity costs of 
conservation (participation) across the landscape, since this spatial pattern will deter-
mine the additional environmental benefits which an agglomeration bonus can deliver.
The mixed findings from our lab-in-the-field experiment nevertheless convey some 
encouraging signals in favour of the joint use of PES auctions and the agglomeration bonus 
in the developing world. Further research is warranted in light of the policy significance of 
this innovative incentive mechanism. It is particularly pertinent in contexts where ambitious 
blanket conservation policies are often adopted on the basis of their apparent simplicity and 
low cost, even though incentive compatible policies are potentially more viable and effec-
tive. For example, recently the State Forestry Administration of China has announced plans 
to impose an outright ban (for an unspecified length of time) on commercial logging in all 
natural forests (as opposed to planted forests) during the country’s 13th Five Year Period 
(2016-2020) (Forest Trends 2016; State Forestry Administration 2016). These natural for-
ests account for 58% of the total area of the country’s forests and 81% of the total standing 
volume. Villages and individuals own 45% of these natural forests, whereas the state (gov-
ernmental bodies and state-owned enterprises, etc.) holds the remaining 55%. This would 
perhaps constitute the largest conservation restriction plan of its kind in the world. Under the 
scheme the government would only offer a nominal uniform compensation rate (CNY 15 per 
mu per year) to owners of communal or private natural forests (whereas the median bid in 
our experiment is CNY 350). The limited amount of compensation reflects the immense size 
of the scheme. As a substantial proportion of forest holders are effectively enrolled against 
their will, there is considerable uncertainty on the efficacy of this grandiose plan.
A PES-type scheme was proposed as an alternative for conserving the entirety of these 
communal and private natural forests, but was eventually abandoned due to being per-
ceived as prohibitively expensive. Yet, there are problems in over-stretching a country’s 
limited financial resources in an attempt to conserve all natural forests. This is likely 
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to be an inferior policy option compared to concentrating conservation actions in prior-
ity areas, chosen on the basis of ecological significance and opportunity cost. In such a 
setting, a PES auction with an agglomeration bonus could provide a more efficient, cost 
effective and viable alternative to both a command-and-control logging ban approach and 
a uniform payment scheme. These potential benefits, however, come at the expense of 
a more complex design and implementation burden, and thus higher transactions costs 
(Banerjee et  al 2017) and the expectation of reduced rates of participation (Rolfe et  al 
2018). This necessitates additional academic endeavours to further assess the viability 
of this PES feature for rural forest land owners in less developed regions with limited 
education and market experience. Our study provides a helpful start in this direction as—
despite its inconclusive results—it serves as a useful ‘proof of concept’ for the potential 
use of the agglomeration bonus in an important policy context such as China.
Our study also served as a valuable ‘stake-holder’ engagement exercise in that it aimed 
to show Chinese policy makers how experimental methods can be used as a tool to design 
new policies. By applying experimental methods in the field with actual land owners (and 
not student subjects) we were able to curb the scepticism that is attached to pure laboratory 
studies and have helped pave the way for a wider acceptance of such methods in policy cir-
cles in China (such as the State Forestry Administration of China).
Many of the broader lessons we learned on conducting field experiments in China are 
similar to those we have encountered in other countries. For example, it is imperative to 
engage with stakeholders and policy-making agencies from the beginning of the design of 
the experimental protocol. It is also vital to take under account local ethnic and cultural 
specificities (in our cases we used local dialects in the protocol where needed, while we also 
employed local translators). It is also important to adapt experimental protocols so that the 
reliability of the experiment is enhanced in the eyes of the participants (for example, in our 
case we used the more cumbersome and costly approach of postal orders and bank transfers 
to make future payments as opposed to the more convenient but less trustworthy option of 
leaving payments to be distributed by local authorities). Yet, our work also allowed us to 
draw some more idiosyncratic lessons specifically for the case of rural China. Firstly, pol-
icy-making agencies appear to be more centralised compared to other regions of the world 
that we have worked in (e.g. Africa, South East Asia, Latin America) while at all the same 
time non-governmental agencies seem to have less leeway to operate within. This some-
what curtails the prospects and flexibility of conducting scientifically robust and independ-
ent large-scale randomised controlled field studies. Yet, on the other hand, our experience 
suggests that there is very strong interest from Chinese policy makers in evidence-based and 
results oriented policy-making approaches. There is also a strong preference on their behalf 
for methods that have a high degree of realism and which rely less on purely theoretical pre-
dictions or on empirical methods that are either based on contrived samples (such as student 
samples) or statistical methods that evoke restrictive (and often untestable) assumptions 
(such as quasi-experimental methods). Hence, we found that there is significant appetite for 
experimental studies that are more directly related to specific policy settings and challenges 
and which include the actual people that would be affected by a potential policy change.
Secondly, although the influence of policymakers in China may appear to limit the flexibil-
ity and independence of conducting large scale behavioural experimental studies, our experi-
ence suggests that can have a positive side for pursing better, more targeted experimental 
protocols. We found that collaborating with government agencies and stakeholders ensured 
higher participation rates and greater local community cooperation compared to most other 
countries we have worked in. This could also be attributed to local cultural and social rea-
sons. It could however ensure that randomisation processes and samples of participants are 
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of very high quality. Also, the puissance of policy makers in China may actually augment the 
scope for exploring more intricate and innovate experimental hypotheses and designs than 
perhaps researchers could consider elsewhere (whilst remaining within ethical experimental 
boundaries). Taken together, our experience from this study suggests that there is significant 
potential for future policy oriented experimental field studies in China.
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Appendix
See Table 5
Table 5  Comparison of means between anomalous and non-anomalous bidders
Variable Non-anomalous 
bidders
Anomalous bidders Mean difference p-value
Mean SD Mean SD
Panel 1: Bid (Bidder-level aver-
ages)
Obs. = 150 Obs. = 42
Bid 883.10 1600.19 2205.18 4625.70 − 1322.08*** 0.00
Bid 1 neighbour 875.85 1488.29 2168.87 4585.79 − 1293.02*** 0.00
Bid 3 neighbours 890.35 1739.63 2241.49 4683.98 − 1351.14*** 0.00
Panel 2: Covariates (Bidder-level) Obs. = 150 Obs. = 42
Timber value drawn 17.10 5.56 18.45 5.58 − 1.35 0.17
Exercise performance 0.87 0.19 0.90 0.13 − 0.03 0.28
Age 47.44 15.17 48.57 13.83 − 1.13 0.66
Gender 0.67 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.10 0.22
Ethnic minority 0.77 0.42 0.81 0.40 − 0.04 0.56
Education 5.54 3.74 5.90 3.46 − 0.36 0.57
Household head 0.61 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.06 0.45
CCP member 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.46 − 0.09 0.24
Village leader 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.01 0.92
Children 0.70 0.79 1.00 0.90 − 0.30** 0.04
Elderly 0.81 0.85 0.71 0.74 0.10 0.49
Students 0.75 0.87 0.86 0.78 − 0.11 0.48
867Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions:…
1 3
References
Angrist JD, Pischke J (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics: an empiricist’s companion. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Woodstock
Arguedas C, van Soest DP (2011) Optimal conservation programs, asymmetric information and the role of 
fixed costs. Environ Resour Econ 50(2):305–323
Banerjee S (2018) Improving spatial coordination rates under the agglomeration bonus scheme: a labo-
ratory experiment with a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary mechanism (nudge). Am J Agric Econ 
100(1):172–197
Banerjee S, Kwasnica AM, Shortle JS (2012) Agglomeration bonus in small and large local networks: a 
laboratory examination of spatial coordination. Ecol Econ 84(December):142–152
Banerjee S, de Vries FP, Hanley N, van Soest DP (2014) The impact of information provision on 
agglomeration bonus performance: an experimental study on local networks. Am J Agric Econ 
96(4):1009–1029
Banerjee S, Kwasnica AM, Shortle JS (2015) Information and auction performance: a laboratory study of 
conservation auctions for spatially contiguous land management. Environ Resour Econ 61(3):409–431
Banerjee S, Cason TN, de Vries FP, Hanley N (2017) Transaction costs, communication and spatial coordi-
nation in payment for ecosystem services schemes. J Environ Econ Manag 83(May):68–89
Baylis K, Honey-Rosés J, Börner J, Corbera E, Ezzine-de-Blas D, Ferraro PJ, Wunder S (2015) Mainstream-
ing impact evaluation in nature conservation. Conserv Lett 9(1):58–64
Boxall P, Adamowicz WL, Moon A (2009) Complexity in choice experiments: choice of the status quo 
alternative and implications for welfare measurement. Aust J Agric Resour Econ 53(4):503–519
Brandts J, Charness G (2011) The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental 
comparisons. Exp Econ 14(3):375–398
Carlsson F, He H, Martinsson P, Qin P, Sutter M (2012) Household decision making in rural China: using 
experiments to estimate the influences of spouses. J Econ Behav Organ 84(2):525–536
Cason TN, Wu SY (2017) Subject pools and deception in agricultural and resource economics experiments. 
Retrieved from http://www.krann ert.purdu e.edu/facul ty/cason /paper s/Sub_pools _decep tion.pdf
Davis DD, Holt CA (1993) Experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Significant results are highlighted in bold italics (up to the 10% significance level)
Asterisks indicate statistical significance: *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01
Table 5  (continued)
Variable Non-anomalous 
bidders
Anomalous bidders Mean difference p-value
Mean SD Mean SD
Savings 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.45 0.14 0.10
Debt 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.48 − 0.03 0.70
Market experience 0.66 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.04 0.62
Land dispossession 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.35
Time preference dummy 1 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.42 0.02 0.80
Time preference dummy 2 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.20
Time preference dummy 3 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.46 − 0.02 0.81
Time preference dummy 4 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49 − 0.09 0.28
Risk preference dummy 1 0.34 0.48 0.36 0.48 − 0.02 0.84
Risk preference dummy 2 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.40 − 0.02 0.72
Risk preference dummy 3 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.04 0.64
Trust in future payments 0.87 0.33 0.79 0.42 0.08 0.16
Environmental awareness 0.98 0.14 1.00 0.00 − 0.02 0.36
Cognitive skills 0.77 0.21 0.74 0.16 0.03 0.50
Joint covariate balance
(p-value)
0.40
868 Z. Liu et al.
1 3
de Vries FP, Hanley N (2016) Incentive-based policy design for pollution control and biodiversity conserva-
tion: a review. Environ Resour Econ 63(4):687–702
Deck C, Jahedi S (2015) An experimental investigation of time discounting in strategic settings. J Behav 
Exp Econ 54:95–104
Drechsler M, Smith HG, Sturm A, Wätzold F (2016) Cost-effectiveness of conservation payment schemes 
for species with different range sizes. Conserv Biol 30(4):894–899
Drichoutis AC, Lusk JL, Nayga RM (2015) The veil of experimental currency units in second price auc-
tions. J Econ Sci Assoc 1(2):182–196
Ferraro PJ (2008) Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services. 
Ecol Econ 65(4):810–821
Ferraro PJ, Pattanayak SK (2006) Money for nothing? A call for empirical evaluation of biodiversity conser-
vation investments. PLoS Biol 4(4):482–488
Ferré M, Engel S, Gsottbauer E (2016) Can agglomeration payments induce sustainable management of 
peat soils in Switzerland?—A computerized framed experiment. Retrieved from: http://www.bioec on-
netwo rk.org/pages /18th_2016/Ferre .pdf
Fooks JR, Higgins N, Messer KD, Duke JM, Hellerstein D, Lynch L (2016) Conserving spatially explicit 
benefits in ecosystem service markets: experimental tests of network bonuses and spatial targeting. Am 
J Agric Econ 98(2):468–488
Forest Trends (2016) China’s logging ban in natural forests: impacts of extended policy at home and abroad. 
Retrieved from: http://www.fores t-trend s.org/docum ents/files /doc_5145.pdf
Fréchette GR (2016) Experimental economics across subject populations. In: Kagel JH, Roth AE (eds) The 
handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Fudenberg D, Levine DK (2006) A dual-self model of impulse control. Am Econ Rev 96(5):1449–1476
Groom B, Grosjean P, Kontoleon A, Swanson T, Zhang S (2010) Relaxing rural constraints: a ‘win-win’ 
policy for poverty and environment in China? Oxf Econ Pap 62(1):132–156
Hanley N, Banerjee S, Lennox GD, Armsworth PR (2012) How should we incentivize private landowners to 
‘produce’ more biodiversity? Oxf Rev Econ Policy 28(1):93–113
Harrison J, McKay R (2012) Delay discounting rates are temporally stable in an equivalent present value 
procedure using theoretical and area under the curve analyses. Psychol Rec 62(2):307–320
Harrison GW, Lau MI, Williams MB (2002) Estimating individual discount rates in Denmark: a field exper-
iment. Am Econ Rev 92(5):1606–1617
Harrison GW, Harstad RM, Rutström EE (2004) Experimental methods and elicitation of values. Exp Econ 
7(2):123–140
Imai K, King G, Stuart EA (2008) Misunderstandings between experimentalists and observationalists about 
causal inference. J R Stat Soc Ser A (Stat Soc) 171(2):481–502
Jack BK (2013) Private information and the allocation of land use subsidies in Malawi. Am Econ J Appl 
Econ 5(3):113–135
King G, Nielsen R, Coberley C, Pope JE, Wells A (2011) Avoiding randomization failure in pro-
gram evaluation, with application to the medicare health support program. Popul Health Manag 
14(S1):S-11–S-22
Kirchkamp O, Reiß JP (2011) Out-of-equilibrium bids in first-price auctions: wrong expectations or wrong 
bids. Econ J 121(557):1361–1397
Kirchkamp O, Poen E, Reiß JP (2009) Outside options: another reason to choose the first-price auction. Eur 
Econ Rev 53(2):153–169
Krämer JE, Wätzold F (2018) The agglomeration bonus in practice—an exploratory assessment of the Swiss 
network bonus. J Nat Conserv 43:126–135
Krawczyk M, Bartczak A, Hanley N, Stenger A (2016) Buying spatially-coordinated ecosystem services: an 
experiment on the role of auction format and communication. Ecol Econ 124(April):36–48
Kuhfuss L, Préget R, Thoyer S, Hanley N (2015) Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental 
schemes: the role of a collective bonus. Eur Rev Agric Econ 43:609–636
Latacz-Lohmann U, Van der Hamsvoort C (1997) Auctioning conservation contracts: a theoretical analysis 
and an application. Am J Agric Econ 79(2):407–418
List JA (2003) Does market experience eliminate market anomalies? Q J Econ 118(1):41–71
List JA (2011) Why economists should conduct field experiments and 14 tips for pulling one off. J Econ 
Perspect 25(3):3–15
Liu Z, Gong Y, Kontoleon A (2018) How do payments for environmental services affect land tenure? The-
ory and evidence from China. Ecol Econ 144:195–213
Lusk JL, Shogren JF (2007) Experimental auctions: Methods and applications in economic and marketing 
research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
869Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions:…
1 3
Manzini P, Mariotti M (2014) A case of framing effects: the elicitation of time preferences. Retrieved from: 
http://www.st-andre ws.ac.uk/~wwwec on/repec files /4/1405.pdf
Margolis M, Shogren JF (2004) Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab. Econ Lett 
84(1):141–147
Margules CR, Pressey RL (2000) Systematic conservation planning. Nature 405(6783):243–253
Messer KD, Ferraro P, Allen W (2015) Behavioral nudges in competitive environments: a field experiment 
examining defaults and social comparisons in a conservation contract auction. Retrieved from: http://
www.bioec on-netwo rk.org/pages /17th_2015/Messe r.pdf
Parkhurst GM, Shogren JF (2007) Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat. Ecol Econ 64(2):344–355
Parkhurst GM, Shogren JF (2008) Smart subsidies for conservation. Am J Agric Econ 90(5):1192–1200
Parkhurst GM, Shogren JF, Bastian C, Kivi P, Donner J, Smith RBW (2002) Agglomeration bonus: 
an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation. Ecol Econ 
41(2):305–328
Reeson AF, Rodriguez LC, Whitten SM, Williams K, Nolles K, Windle J, Rolfe J (2011) Adapting auctions 
for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale. Ecol Econ 70(9):1621–1627
Rolfe J, Schilizzi S, Boxall P, Latacz-Lohmann U, Iftekhar S, Star M, O’Connor P (2018) Identifying the 
causes of low participation rates in conservation tenders. Int Rev Environ Resour Econ 12:1–45
Schilizzi S, Latacz-Lohmann U (2007) Assessing the performance of conservation auctions: an experimen-
tal study. Land Econ 83(4):497–515
Shafir E, Diamond P, Tversky A (1997) Money illusion. Q J Econ 112(2):341–374
State Forestry Administration (2016) The  13th five year plan for Forestry (in Chinese). Retrieved from: 
http://www.fores try.gov.cn/uploa dfile /main/2016-5/file/2016-5-19-4e069 9f79b 4b4a2 ab038 43684 
dd32c 76.pdf
Stubbs M (2014) Conservation reserve program (CRP): status and issues. Retrieved from: http://natio nalag 
lawce nter.org/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/asset s/crs/R4278 3.pdf
Suter JF, Vossler CA (2014) Towards an understanding of the performance of ambient tax mechanisms in 
the field: evidence from upstate New York dairy farmers. Am J Agric Econ 96(1):92–107
USDA (1998) Agreement between the USDA commodity credit corporation and the state of oregon and 
clean water services of the County of Washington State of Oregon: concerning the implementation of 
a conservation reserve enhancement program. Retrieved from: http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Asset s/USDA-
FSA-Publi c/usdafi les/Conse rvati on/PDF/orcre pagmn t1209 04.pdf
Wang X, Bennett J, Xu J, Zhang H (2012) An auction scheme for land use change in Sichuan Province, 
China. J Environ Plann Manag 55(10):1269–1288
Warziniack T, Shogren JF, Parkhurst G (2007) Creating contiguous forest habitat: an experimental examina-
tion on incentives and communication. J For Econ 13(2–3):191–207
Whitten SM, Reeson A, Windle J, Rolfe J (2013) Designing conservation tenders to support landholder par-
ticipation: a framework and case study assessment. Ecosyst Serv 6(December):82–92
Williams KJ, Reeson AF, Drielsma MJ, Love J (2012) Optimised whole-landscape ecological metrics for effec-
tive delivery of connectivity-focused conservation incentive payments. Ecol Econ 81(September):48–59
Xu J, Tao R, Xu Z, Bennett MT (2010a) China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program: does expansion equal 
success? Land Econ 86(2):219–244
Xu J, White A, Lele U (2010b) China’s forest tenure reforms: impacts and implications for choice, conserva-
tion, and climate change. The Rights and Resources Initiative, Washington
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations.
